We host different speakers at our Economic Theory & Policy Seminar. Seminars take place most Mondays at 4pm in Sem. R. DA green 04.  

Upcoming topics and speakers will be posted below.

08. April 2024, 16:00 until 17:30

Theory & Policy Seminar / Joao Galindo da Fonseca (Univ. of Montreal) / How are wages determined: A quasi-experimental test of wage determination theories

Seminar

Joao Galindo da Fonseca will give a talk at our Economic Theory & Policy Seminar.

"How are wages determined: A quasi-experimental test of wage determination theories"

 Joao Galindo da Fonseca, opens an external URL in a new window (University of Montreal)

We test whether firm-specific demand shocks impact wages, and disentangle predictions coming from wage bargaining and wage posting. We use a unique institutional feature of public procurement auctions in Brazil: the moment in which the auction ends is random. For close auctions, winner and runner-up are as good as randomly assigned. In addition, contract value is higher for auctions that (randomly) end earlier. Winning a contract increases wages. We disentangle the effect on wages that comes from changes in firm size (wage posting) and the part that comes from changes in contract value (bargaining). We find evidence consistent with bargaining.

Calendar entry

Event location

TU Wien, DA green 04
1040 Vienna
Wiedner Haupstr. 8-10, Freihaus Buidling, green area, 4th floor (Seminarroom DA04 green)

 

Organiser

ECON
Julia Hutter
julia.hutter@tuwien.ac.at

 

Public

Yes

 

Entrance fee

No

 

Registration required

No

Theory & Policy Seminar / Joao Galindo da Fonseca (Univ. of Montreal) / How are wages determined: A quasi-experimental test of wage determination theories

Joao Galindo da Fonseca will give a talk at our Economic Theory & Policy Seminar.

"How are wages determined: A quasi-experimental test of wage determination theories"

 Joao Galindo da Fonseca, opens an external URL in a new window (University of Montreal)

We test whether firm-specific demand shocks impact wages, and disentangle predictions coming from wage bargaining and wage posting. We use a unique institutional feature of public procurement auctions in Brazil: the moment in which the auction ends is random. For close auctions, winner and runner-up are as good as randomly assigned. In addition, contract value is higher for auctions that (randomly) end earlier. Winning a contract increases wages. We disentangle the effect on wages that comes from changes in firm size (wage posting) and the part that comes from changes in contract value (bargaining). We find evidence consistent with bargaining.